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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM
WHITAKER, CAROL WHIT..
TAKER, and DENISE WHITTAK..
ER, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Wil..
liam Whittaker,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No.
-vs.-

8894

ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH
JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and
NORTH AMERICAN VAN
LINES,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Three large tractor--semi trailer type motor vehicles were
parked on the highway on December 15, 1957. About 2:30
o'clock A.M. the first unit had difficulty with its head-lights and parked with the wheels on the right side on the
shoulder and the wheels on the driver's side on the paved
portion of the highway (Ex. 6.-D.-134--23 and 218.-24.).
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Being partially parked on the sloping shoulder this unit
was in a tilting position. This unit is referred to as Unit
1. Defendant .Alvin Underwood was driving Unit 2, the
Johnson unit. Unit 2 passed Unit 1 and stopped and parked
with all wheels on the paved portion of the highway 100
to 150 feet ahead of Unit 1. (T. 218.-4.-Ex. 6.-D.) Under..
wood then walked back to Unit 1 to render assistance.
Defendant H. E. Woolf was driving North American
Van Lines Unit 3. Unit 3 passed units 1 and 2, and stop.ped and parked on the paved portion of the highway 100
to 150 feet ahead of Unit 2. All three large tractor.-trailer
units were facing east. Unit 1 was partially on the shoulder,
Units 2 and 3 were parked with all wheels on the paved
portion of the highway. Plaintiffs, all in a Nash car driven
by William Whitaker, passed Unit 1, but because of on..
coming traffic, pulled up and stopped behind Unit 2 to
permit traffic coming from the opposite direction to pass.
(T. 138.-9.-136.-19.-142.4.)
Units 1, 2, 3, and the Whittaker unit were all to the
right of the center line. There was evidence by the plain..
tiffs and an independent witness that the Johnson unit,
No. 2, driven by Underwood had no lights on. (T. 238.. 22.24) (239.-25) (247.-18, 20, 25.) The party so testifying
being the first to arrive, 2 or 3 minutes after the accident.
(244.-12.) All units were facing easterly and while all were
thus parked, Nancy Dillingham, operating a fourth car, a
Chevrolet pickup truck, passed Unit 1 and cut back in
to the right side to avoid traffic approaching from the op.posite direction, (254 .. 10), and ran into the rear of the
Whittaker Nash car parked behind Unit 2, forcing it
against Unit 2 resulting in the injuries and damages. The
pre.-trial order found Nancy Dillingham negligent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
Nancy Dillingham settled with plaintiffs, and plaintiffs
proceeded against the remaining defendants. The jury re ..
turned a verdict no case for action.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. ERROR IN INSTRUCfiNG THAT NANCY DIL..
LINGHAM WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, AND LATER INSTRUCfiNG THAT IF SHE
WAS NEGLIGENT, HER NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE AND TO FIND IN FA..
VOR OF DEFENDANTS.

2. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCf ON POSSIBILITY OF
SO PARKING AS CONSTITUTING A TRAP OR
DANGER.
3. ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT DEFEND..
ANTS WERE UNDER NO DUTY TO PLACE LIGHT..
ED FLARES AROUND VEHICLES.
4. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT JURY OF DUTY TO
PROCEED UNTIL THE DEFENDANTS COULD
SAFELY PARK OFF THE HIGHWAY.
5. REFUSAL TO DEFINE THE WORD "PRACTI..
CABLE" AS NOT BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH
CONVENIENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT NANCY DIL..
LINGHAM WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF
LAW, AND LATER INSTRUCfiNG THAT IF SHE
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WAS NEGLIGENT, HER NEGLIGENCE WAS THE
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE AND TO FIND IN FA..
VOR OF DEFENDANTS.
In Instruction 6(T..-80) the court instructed the jury
that Nancy Dillingham, the driver of the pickup truck, was
negligent as a matter of law as found in the pre..-trial order.
The court instructed the jury in Instruction 27 (T.. l03)
as follows:
"You are instructed that the driver of the pick.up truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if
you find that she observed the hazards, if any, of
the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under
the circumstances should have observed said ve..
hides, but because of her negligence failed to do so
in time to avoid said accident, then you are instruct..
ed that the negligence on her part was the sole
proximate cause of the collision, and your verdict
must be in favor of the defendants and against the
plaintiffs, no cause of action."
Instruction 27 was excepted to and the court invited
to change it (T..-303.-14).
Under such an instruction the court took away from
the jury any question of concurrent contributing negligence
on the part of the defendants and whether defendants'
negligence was a contributing proximate cause. It is the
perogative of the jury to determine whether under the
facts defendants and respondents were negligent, and
whether or not negligence of the defendants proximately
contributed to the resulting injuries and damages.
The court's instructions constitute a directed verdict
against plaintiffs. This is an invasion of the provence of
the jury and error.
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POINT 2
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON FORESEEABILITY
OF PARKING AS CONSTITUTING A TRAP OR
DANGER.
The court erred in refusing to give requested instruc.tion 10 (T49). This instruction requested the court to in.struct the jury that if they should find from a preponder.ance of the evidence that an ordinary prudent person
should have foreseen that so parking a series of large units
was likely to result in injury, or that the ordinary prudent
person could have foreseen that the placing of a solid
wall of trucks without using lanterns or flares, or by reason
of spacing would be foreseeable as a likely trap or danger
to traffic was certainly a proper request.
Refused request no 12 (T.-51) is copied in part from
Hillyard vs. Utah By.-Products, 263 P2d at 287, 1 U2d 143.
Under this instruction negligence is defined as exposing
another to unreasonable risk or harm or foreseeable con.duct whether it be innocent negligence or criminal, and
since the Supreme Court has defined it so at page 290
refusal to so instruct was error. See request no. 14 (T.-53).
It was error not to instruct that it is not necessary to foresee
the exact form in which the accident happened from the
Hillyard case above, quote:
"The test of liability is not whether . . . the
defendant could ... have foreseen the precise form
in which the injury actually happened, but he must
be held for anything which . . . appears to have
been a natural and probable consequence of his
act. If the act is one which [he] ... could have
anticipated as likely to result in injury . . .".
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Error in refusal to give request 17 (T--56) on the ques ..
tion of whether or not it was foreseeable that a series of
large units so parked might likely result in injury. See
Shelton v. Lowell, 249 P2d 958, Ore.
"The question is: could the defendants have
foreseen in the exercise of ordinary care that their
act in leaving the truck on the highway without a
warning flag being placed 300 feet to the south or
at the curve on the highway would naturally and
probably result in harm of some kind to another."
Plaintiffs are entitled to have the court instruct the
jury in such a manner that the theory of plaintiffs' case
may be presented to the jury, Miller v. Southern Pacific,
21 P2d 865, 82 U 46.
"Each party to a law suit is entitled to advocate
his theory and on submission to the jury is en.titled to a submission of it upon his theory, and
have the jury instructed on his theory, and the
law as applicable to such theory; but such right
does not include therein the right to develop a
theory of law for the particular case. .
"
POINT 3
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT THE DEFEND..
ANTS WERE UNDER NO DUTY TO PLACE LIGHT..
ED FLARES AROUND VEHICLES.
Plaintiffs' requested instructions no. 18, 19, 34, and
35 requested the court to permit the jury to determine
whether under the facts and circumstances the defendants
were negligent in not placing lighted flares on the road.
The court refused all these requests. Defendants Alvin
Underwood and Joseph Johnson admit they were parked
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on the highway fifteen ( 15) minutes-see Answers to
Interrogatories T.-32.-13 also under evidence. There was
evidence Unit 2 had no lights on. Under Instruction No.
23 the court instructed:
"They were under no duty to place lighted
flares around the vehicles."
Under this point the court erred for three reasons:
1. It does not require an act of the legislature to create
a duty, the violation of which constitutes negligence. There
is no statute requiring a motorist to keep a proper lookout.
Yet it would be error for the court to instruct that a de ..
fendant was under no duty to keep a lookout. Large units
60 feet long and 8 feet wide owe a greater duty when
parked than does a smaller car. Whether or not the defend ..
ants were under a duty to place out flares depends on all
the circumstances, and the plaintiffs were entitled to go
to the jury on the question of whether three large units
parked in a series under the evidence and without flares
constituted negligence. The jury might have found that
a motorist could believe he could safely pass one or two
units and find himself in a trap, unable to pass the second
or the third unit because of traffic in the opposite direction.
It was therefore error for the court to instruct the jury
that the defendants were under no duty, because a duty
can be imposed upon a person with respect to a foreseeable
conduct likely to expose another to risk or harm whether
there is a statute imposing such a duty or not. Moreover,
Nancy Dillingham testified that as she approached, the
parked tractor.-trailer appeared to be moving and because
"they were on open highway" T.-252.-11, 15, 26. Flares
out would have left no question in her mind on this point,
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she was very near the unit when she first learned it was
not moving. T--254--10.
2. The State law requires disabled tractor--trailers to
place out flares. The mere fact that the defendant were
not disabled does not relieve them from such responsibility.
41--6--101 U.C.A. 53 prohibits a vehicle not disabled from
parking on the highway. 41--6--152 requires disabled ve..
hides of the types involved to place out flares. Certainly
where there is a prohibition of parking where practical to
park off the pavement, it follows that the legislature did
not intend to license vehicles not disabled to park without
placing out flares or to park on the pavement of the high..
way in the night without placing of flares, or warnings.
3. Defendants were non--residents engaged in interstate
commerce, see Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Amended
Complaint, T--1, Notice of Service, T--9, and Affidavit, T--6.
Defendant Alvin Underwood testified he knew the law
required, if disabled, that flares be placed out. T--279.-25.
Underwood was there assisting a disabled vehicle for fifteen
minutes. Defendants did not put out flares or suggest to
the disabled vehicle's operator that he put out flares. T.-277 ..
22 to 278.-11 inclusive. Defendants did not put out any
flares. T.-252.-28. Federal Law requires the defendants to
place out flares. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission have the force and effect of law. Woods vs.
New York City, 88 NE2d 740:
"Under that act the Interstate Commerce Com.mission is empowered to make rules and regula..
tions . . . These regulations have the force of law
and are judicially noticed.-317 US 481. Strict com.pliance with the rules and specifications, etc."
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Williams vs. New York Central, 84 NE2d at 403:
"The rules adopted by Interstate Commerce
Commission . . . are as integral part of the act
and have the force of the statute. . . . "
The regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commis-sion are as follows:

s 192.23
"Emergency Signals: Stopped or parked ve-hicles. Whenever for any cause other than disable-ment or necessary traffic stops, any motor vehicle
is stopped upon the traveled portion of any high-way, or shoulder thereof, during the time lights
are required except within a municipality where
there is sufficient highway lighting to make clearly
discernible persons and vehicles on the highway
at a distance of 500 feet, the following require-ments shall be observed:
(a) The driver of such vehicle shall immediate-ly place on the traveled side of the vehicle, a lighted
/usee, a lighted red electric lantern, or a red emer-gency reflector."
These regulations have the force and effect of law.
The case of TWA vs. Northland Greyhound, 275 NW
846, held that the question of whether or not flares should
have been placed out is a jury question.
POINT 4
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY OF DUTY
TO PROCEED UNTIL DEFENDANTS COULD SAFE-LY PARK OFF THE HIGHWAY.
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41.-6.-101 UCA 1953 provides as follows:
" ... No person shall stop, park, or leave stand ..
ing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended
upon the paved or main traveled part of the high..
way when it is PRACTICAL to stop, park, or
leave such vehicle off such part of said highway."
Failure to give requested instruction (20(T.-59) that de..
fendants had a duty to proceed forward until they could
safely take their vehicles off the paved portion of the high..
way was error. Refusal to give request 21 (T.-60) was also
error. The latter stating that the rendering of assistance
does not relieve the defendants of responsibility so far
as negligence is concerned, see Gorego vs. Cornwall, 222
P2d 606. Defendants did not even consider driving ahead
300 or 400 feet to see if he could park off the road (T.-295.6), yet the court took this from the jury's consideration.
The court even refused to permit testimony on the issue
to show the road was wide enough to park off just imme..
diately a few hundred feet ahead, and labeled it as "unfair"
to show this (T.-301.-1).
Failure to give requested instruction no. 13 was error.
This request was copied from Hillard vs. Utah By.-Products,
supra, wherein the court stated:
"The parking of a vehicle upon the paved or
traveled portion of a highway is generally regarded
as a hazard to traffic thereon. . . ."
The jury was led to believe that the defendants could park
any place they pleased on the highway by the court's re..
fusal to instruct as requested. This is particularly true in
light of Point 5 which follows. See also Borgert vs. Spurling,
230 P2d 183.
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"Alvin Fox clearly violated the parking statute.
His car was not disabled, and, Good Samaritan
though he was, his generous impulses afforded him
no exemption from the statute's command.... "
The evidence was that defendants could have pulled off
the highway at a lighted motel 2, 3, or 4 blocks ahead,
T..240..7.
POINT 5
REFUSAL TO DEFINE THE WORD "PRACTI..
CABLE AS NOT BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH CON..
VENIENT.
The statute quoted under point 4 uses the word practi.cal. Refusal of request no. 1 was error. The jury should
have been instructed that the word practical is not synony..
mous with convenient and 60 C.}.S. 773, Note 69 was
quoted at the bottom of the instruction where the law
requires such an instruction.
The court refused to instruct the jury that the word
practicable was not synonymous with convenient, or at
all on this point. The jury was left with the impression
that the defendants could park any placed they pleased
without regard to the safety to others, since the court re..
fused to define practical as other courts have.
Respectfully submitted,
E. L. SCHOENHALS,
Attorney for Appellants
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